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In this paper, we deﬁne a family of fuzzy hybrid logics that are based on Gödel logic. It
is composed of two inﬁnite-valued versions called GH∞ and WGH∞, and a sequence of
ﬁnitary valued versions (GHn)0<n<∞. We deﬁne decision procedures for both WGH∞ and
(GHn)0<n<∞ that are based on particular sequents and on a set of proof rules dealing with
such sequents. As these rules are strongly invertible the procedures naturally allow one to
generate countermodels. Therefore we prove the decidability and the ﬁnite model property
for these logics. Finally, from the decision procedure of WGH∞, we design a sound and
complete sequent calculus for this logic.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Gödel logic and its ﬁnitary versions are logics between classical and intuitionistic logics (intermediate logics) with se-
mantics based on linear Kripke models. It was introduced by Gödel and later axiomatized by Dummett in [12]. A Hilbert
axiomatic system for this logic is obtained by adding A → B ∨ B → A to axioms of intuitionistic logic. Gödel logic is one of
the most studied intermediate logics because it has been recognized as a fuzzy logic [17]. One of the interests of its ﬁnitary
versions is that the countermodel search problem has been characterized as resource use bounding logics for a particular
process calculus [21]. In addition a characterization of validity based on particular bi-colored graphs has been proposed for
this logic [15].
We know that in the possible world semantics (Kripke semantics) of modal logics, any formula is either true or false at
any world (2-valued modal logic) [7,10]. A fuzzy modal logic is a combination of a fuzzy logic and a modal logic such that a
formula at a given world may have a truth value other than true and false (many-valued modal logic) [17]. In the literature,
there exist various versions of fuzzy modal logics like, for instance, the one based on basic fuzzy logic [18] and also the
ﬁnite-valued modal logics given in [13,14,24]. In this work we are interested in the fuzzy modal logics based on Gödel logic
and its ﬁnitary versions [9,13,14,18]. Let us recall that hybrid logics were introduced in order to express this relativity of
truth to the worlds of a model [1,6]. They are obtained by adding to modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols
called nominals, and moreover, by adding a new operator, called satisfaction operator, that allows us to jump to the world
named by a nominal.
In this paper, we deﬁne a family of fuzzy hybrid logics based on Gödel logic and its ﬁnitary versions. One of the moti-
vations of such logics is the connection between hybrid logics and description logics [16] and their ability to reason about
imprecise knowledge. The new logics presented here are obtained from the Gödel modal logics proposed in [9,13,14,18]. Our
approach is similar to the one used to introduce the many-valued hybrid logic MVHL [19], where the Kripke models take
values in a ﬁxed ﬁnite Heyting algebra. The tableau system of MVHL essentially comes from the ﬁniteness of the Heyting
algebra and from the use of a language containing constants for all the truth values. In our family of fuzzy hybrid logics,
there are logics built over inﬁnite algebras and our language does not contain constants for the truth values.
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are interpreted as usual in Gödel logic and modalities  and ♦ are interpreted using the inﬁmum and the supremum. The
satisfaction operator and the nominals are interpreted as usual in hybrid logics. The family of our logics is composed of
two inﬁnite-valued versions, namely GH∞ and WGH∞ , and a sequence of ﬁnite-valued versions (GHn)0<n<∞ (GHn is the
(n + 1)-valued version). We have two inﬁnite versions because of the two versions of inﬁnite-valued Gödel logic in the
literature, namely Gödel modal logic [9] and witnessed Gödel modal logic [18]. These two versions are different because in
WGH∞ we only consider the Kripke model where the inﬁmum and the supremum correspond respectively to the minimum
and the maximum.
After the presentation of our new logics, we study decidability and also proof-search in WGH∞ and (GHn)0<n<∞ . In this
perspective we introduce a particular notion of sequent structure similar to the one given in [5]. Using this structure, we
propose a set of proof rules and we prove that they are strongly sound and strongly invertible. It is important to notice that
we deﬁne the same set of proof rules for both WGH∞ and (GHn)0<n<∞ . Then, we give decision procedures for WGH∞ and
(GHn)0<n<∞ that naturally allow to generate countermodels. They consist ﬁrstly in reducing, by a proof-search process using
our set of proof rules, a sequent into a set of so-called irreducible sequents and then secondly in deciding these speciﬁc
sequents by an appropriate procedure. In order to decide the irreducible sequents, we associate to any irreducible sequent a
particular ﬁnite bi-colored graph, adapting a method developed for Gödel logic [22], and we give a characterization of validity
based on the detection of particular chains in this graph. From these procedures we show that WGH∞ and (GHn)0<n<∞ are
decidable and also prove the ﬁnite model property. Finally we deﬁne a sequent calculus for WGH∞ from our set of proof
rules by adding an axiom and some structural rules.
2. Gödel modal logics
In this section, we propose a short description of ﬁnite and inﬁnite versions of propositional Gödel modal logics [9,13,
14,18].
We start by considering the family of propositional Gödel modal logics GMn . The value n belongs to the set N∗ =
{1,2, . . .} ∪ {∞} of strictly positive natural numbers augmented with a greatest element ∞.
The set of propositional formulas is inductively deﬁned, starting from a set of propositional variables with an additional
bottom constant ⊥ denoting absurdity and using the connectives ∧, ∨ and → and the modalities  and ♦.
The semantics of GMn is based on fuzzy Kripke models where the valuation at each world and also the accessibility
relation between worlds are many-valued.
We note Sn the set of truth-values deﬁned as follows:
Sn =
{ [0,1] if n = ∞
{0, 1n , 2n , . . . ,1} otherwise
and we note ∗ and  the functions deﬁned as follows:
a ∗ b =min{a,b}, ab =
{
1 if a b
b otherwise
Deﬁnition 2.1. A GMn-Kripke model is a triple M = (W , R, V ) in which W is a non-empty set of worlds, R is a function
from W × W to Sn and V is a function from W × Var to Sn (valuation).
The valuations are inductively extended to formulas as follows:
V (w,⊥) = 0;
V (w, A ∧ B) =min{V (w, A), V (w, B)};
V (w, A ∨ B) =max{V (w, A), V (w, B)};
V (w, A ⊃ B) = V (w, A)V (w, B);
V (w,A) = inf{R(w,w ′)V (w ′, A) | w ′ ∈ W };
V (w,♦A) = sup{R(w,w ′) ∗ V (w ′, A) | w ′ ∈ W }
where inf and sup denote respectively the inﬁmum and the supremum.
A formula A is valid in M = (W , R, V ), written M  A, iff V (w, A) = 1 for any w ∈ W . A formula A is valid in GMn ,
written GMn  A, iff it is valid in every GMn-Kripke model. The negation ¬ is deﬁned by ¬A =def A ⊃ ⊥. Note that the
interdeﬁnability between  and ♦ given by ♦A =def ¬¬A breaks down in GMn for n > 1.
We notice that for the sake of simplicity, we choose Sn = {0, 1n , 2n , . . . ,1}. For example, we obtain the same logic if we
take Sn = {0, r1, r2, . . . , rn−1,1} where {r1, r2, . . . , rn−1} is a set of rational numbers with 0 < r1 < r2 < · · · < rn−1 < 1. It is
because that the Gödel algebra having {0, r1, r2, . . . , rn−1,1} as underlying set is isomorphic to the one having {0, 1n , 2n , . . . ,1}
as underlying set. In fact, we can take any Gödel algebra having a set of size n + 1 as underlying set. Let us recall that a
Gödel algebra is a Heyting algebra satisfying prelinearity: (x → y) ∨ (y → x), i.e., for any elements x and y in the algebra,
x y or y  x. For more details about Gödel algebras we refer to [17].
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2) (A ∧ B) ⊃ A 9) (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ (B ⊃ (A ⊃ C))
3) (A ∧ B) ⊃ B 10) ((A ⊃ C) ∧ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ∨ B) ⊃ C)
4) A ⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧ B)) 11) (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ∧ B) ⊃ C)
5) ⊥ ⊃ A 12) ((C ⊃ A) ∧ (C ⊃ B)) ⊃ (C ⊃ (A ∧ B))
6) A ⊃ (A ∨ B) 13) (A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
7) B ⊃ (A ∨ B) 14) (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A)
A ⊃ B A
B
[MP ]
Fig. 1. An axiomatization of Gödel logic.
In the particular case of GM∞ , Hilbert axiomatic system of the -free and ♦-free fragments of this logic are provided
in [9]. They are obtained by extending the standard axiomatization of the Gödel logic (Fig. 1) with the following axioms and
rules:
K: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
Z: ¬¬A ⊃¬¬A
A
A [RN]
D♦: ♦(A ∨ B) ⊃ (♦A ∨ ♦B)
Z♦: ♦¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬♦A
F♦: ¬♦⊥
A ⊃ B
♦A ⊃ ♦B [RN♦]
Clearly, in the GMn-Kripke models with n = ∞, the inﬁmum and the supremum functions, used in the deﬁnition of the
extension of the valuations to formulas, correspond respectively to the minimum and the maximum.
This is not the case in all the GM∞-Kripke models. Indeed, the value of V (w,A) (resp. V (w,♦A)) may not be witnessed
by the value of R(w,w ′)V (w ′, A) (resp. R(w,w ′)∗ V (w ′, A)) for any world w ′ . For example the set S = {x | x > 0 and x ∈
[0,1]} has 0 as inﬁmum but 0 /∈ S . In fact, there is another Gödel modal logic obtained by restricting the validity notion to
the models where every inﬁmum (resp. supremum) is a minimum (resp. maximum). It is called the witnessed Gödel modal
logic WGM∞ (see [18]).
Deﬁnition 2.2. A WGM∞-Kripke model M = (W , R, V ) is a GM∞-Kripke model where for all modal formulas A (resp.
♦A) and w ∈ W , we have V (w,A) = R(w,w ′)V (w ′, A) (resp. V (w,♦A) = R(w,w ′) ∗ V (w ′, A)) for a world w ′ ∈ W .
Proposition 2.3. ¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬A is valid in WGM∞ .
Proof. We suppose that ¬¬A⊃¬¬A is not valid in WGM∞ . Let M= (W , R, V ) be a countermodel of ¬¬A⊃¬¬A.
Then, there exists w ∈ W such that V (w,¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬A) < 1. Thus, V (w,¬¬A) > V (w,¬¬A) holds. We have
V (w,¬¬A) = (V (w,A)0)0 and since V (w,¬¬A) < 1, V (w,A) = 0 holds. Thus, there exists w0 ∈ W such
that R(w,w0)V (w0, A) = 0 (V (w0, A) = 0). We have V (w,¬¬A) = min{R(w,w ′)((V (w ′, A)0)0)}  0. Since
R(w,w0)((V (w0, A)0)0) = 0, V (w,¬¬A) = 0 holds. As V (w,¬¬A) > V (w,¬¬A), we get a contradiction. 
Proposition 2.4. ¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬A is not valid in GM∞ .
Proof. A countermodel M = (W , R, V ) of ¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬A in GM∞ is given in [9], with W = N, for all n,m ∈ W ,
R(n,m) = 1 and for all n ∈ W , V (n, p) = 1n+1 . 
Let L1 and L2 be two logics having the same syntax. L1 ⊂ L2 means that the set of valid formulas in L1 is a subset of
the set of valid formulas in L2.
Theorem 2.5. GM∞ ⊂ WGM∞ .
Proof. WGM∞ is a restriction of the class of models of GM∞ and the result is deduced from Propositions 2.3 and 2.4. 
Each of the modal logics listed above except GM∞ has the ﬁnite model property and is decidable [9,13,14,18]. We
recall that a logic has a ﬁnite model property if and only if a formula in this logic is not valid then there exists a ﬁnite
countermodel of this formula. The logic GM∞ does not have the ﬁnite model property, however its -free fragment has
this property [9].
Gödel modal logics presented in this section correspond to minimal modal logics K. There exists a way to extend these
logics with conditions on the accessibility relation [9]. For example, a GM∞-Kripke modal M = (W , R, V ) is reﬂexive if
R(w,w) = 1 for all w ∈ W ; it is transitive if R(w,w ′)× R(w ′,w ′′) R(w,w ′′) for all w,w ′,w ′′ ∈ W ; and it is symmetric if
R(w,w ′) = R(w ′,w) for all w,w ′ ∈ W .
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Hybrid logics are logics obtained by adding to modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols, called nominals, which
are used to refer to speciﬁc worlds in a model. Moreover, new operators having many nice logical properties and called the
satisfaction operators are added. They allow us to jump to the worlds named by nominals. For more details about hybrid
logics see [1,6].
In this paper, we propose a family of fuzzy hybrid logics using the same formulas of classical hybrid logic and based on
the Gödel modal logics presented previously. These logics are denoted by GHn and WGH∞ with n ∈ N∗ . Our approach is
similar to the one used to introduce the many-valued hybrid logic MVHL [19], where the Kripke models take values in a
ﬁxed ﬁnite Heyting algebra. Let us note that the tableau system of MVHL is based on the ﬁniteness of the Heyting algebra
and the use of a language containing constants for all the truth values. In our family of fuzzy hybrid logics, there are logics
built over inﬁnite algebras. Moreover, our language does not contain constants for the truth values.
Let Prop be a countably set of propositional symbols and Nom be a countably set of nominals, disjoint from Prop. We
use p,q, r, . . . to range over Prop; and a,b, c, . . . to range over nominals.
The formulas of GHn and WGH∞ are given by the following grammar:
F ::= p | a | ⊥ |F ∧F |F ∨F |F ⊃F |F | ♦F | a :F
Nom(S) denotes the set of nominals that are in the syntactic object S .
Now, we give the semantics for each Gödel hybrid logic by using the same notion of Kripke model as deﬁned in Section 2.
A GHn-Kripke model (resp. WGH∞-Kripke model) is a GMn-Kripke model (resp. WGM∞-Kripke model).
Deﬁnition 3.1. Given a model M = (W , R, V ), an M-assignment is a function which assigns to each nominal a world in
W . The extension of the valuation V w.r.t. the M-assignment g , denoted V g , is deﬁned inductively as follows:
V g(w,⊥) = 0;
V g(w, A ∧ B) =min{V g(w, A), V g(w, B)};
V g(w, A ∨ B) =max{V g(w, A), V g(w, B)};
V g(w, A ⊃ B) = V g(w, A)V g(w, B);
V g(w,A) = inf{R(w,w ′)V g(w ′, A) | w ′ ∈ W };
V g(w,♦A) = sup{R(w,w ′) ∗ V g(w ′, A) | w ′ ∈ W };
V g(w,a) =
{
1 if g(a) = w
0 otherwise;
V g(w,a : A) = V g(g(a), A).
Clearly, each Gödel hybrid logic is conservative over its corresponding version of Gödel modal logic and of Gödel non-
modal logic.
It is known that Gödel logic and its ﬁnitary versions are recognized as intermediate logics (between classical and intu-
itionistic logics). Now, we prove that our Gödel hybrid logics have such a property: they are between classical hybrid logic
and intuitionistic hybrid logic. Let us note that IHL, studied by Braüner and de Paiva in [8], denotes the set of formulas valid
in intuitionistic hybrid logic and CHL denotes the set of formulas valid in classical hybrid logic.
As in the case of classical and intuitionistic logics [2], we deﬁne an intermediate hybrid logic as a set of formulas L
satisfying IHL ⊆L⊆ CHL.
Theorem 3.2. The following strictly decreasing sequence holds:
CHL = GH1 ⊃ GH2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ GHn ⊃ · · · ⊃ WGH∞ ⊃ GH∞ ⊃ IHL
Proof. We start by proving that for all n ∈ N, GHn ⊃ GHn+1 holds.
GHn is a restriction of the class of models of GHn+1 in the sense that the GHn-Kripke models are deﬁned over a set
of n + 1 truth-values but the GHn+1-Kripke models are deﬁned over a set of n + 2 truth-values. Thus, GHn ⊇ GHn+1 holds.
Since GHn and GHn+1 are conservative over respectively n + 1-valued and n + 2-valued Gödel non-modal logics and the
second one is strictly included in the ﬁrst one, GHn ⊃ GHn+1 holds.
WGH∞ ⊃ GH∞ is proved from Theorem 2.5 and the fact that WGH∞ and GH∞ are respectively conservative over WGM∞
and GM∞ .
Now, we prove that for all n ∈ N∗ such that n = ∞ we have GHn ⊃ WGH∞ . Since in any GHn-Kripke model, with n = ∞,
the inﬁmum and the supremum correspond respectively to the minimum and the maximum, we have GHn is a restriction
of the class of models of WGH∞ . Thus GHn ⊇ WGH∞ holds. Since WGH∞ is conservative over the inﬁnite version of Gödel
non-modal logic and this version is strictly included in any ﬁnite version, GHn ⊃ WGH∞ holds.
Finally, to prove that GH∞ ⊃ IHL, we ﬁrst prove GH∞ ⊇ IHL by showing the soundness of all the rules of the natural
deduction system of IHL [8] in GH∞ . For instance, consider the rule of [E ]:
D. Galmiche, Y. Salhi / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 371–385 375W ; [G | C  a : A] W ; [G | C  a : B]
W ; [G | C  a : A ∧ B] [∧R ]
W ; [G | a : A  C | a : B  C]
W ; [G | a : A ∧ B  C] [∧L ]
W ; [G | a : A  C] W ; [G | a : B  C]
W ; [G | a : A ∨ B  C] [∨L ]
W ; [G | C  a : A | A  a : B]
W ; [G | C  a : A ∨ B] [∨R ]
W ; [G | a : B < a : A] W ; [G | a : B < C]
W ; [G | a : A ⊃ B < C] [⊃
<
L ]
W ; [G | a : A a : B | C < a : B] W ; [G | C < ]
W ; [G | C < a : A ⊃ B] [⊃
<
R ]
W ; [G |  C | a : B < a : A] W ; [G | a : B  C]
W ; [G | a : A ⊃ B  C] [⊃

L ]
W ; [G | a : A a : B | C  a : B]
W ; [G | C  a : A ⊃ B] [⊃

R ]
Fig. 2. Logical rules for GHn and WGH∞ .
a :A a : ♦e
e : A [E ]
We suppose that e : A has a countermodel in GH∞ . Then there are a GH∞-Kripke model M = (W , R, V ), an M-
assignment g and w0 ∈ W such that V g(w0, A) < 1. If V g(w0,a : ♦e) = 1 then R(g(a), g(e)) = 1 and V g(g(a),A) < 1.
Otherwise, we have V g(w0,a : ♦e) < 1. Thus, [I ] is sound in GH∞ . Since IHL and GH∞ are conservative over respectively
intuitionistic and inﬁnite-valued version of Gödel logic and the ﬁrst one is strictly included in the second one, GH∞ ⊃ IHL
holds. 
4. Proof rules
In this section, we introduce a set of proof rules that are strongly sound and strongly invertible for the ﬁnitary versions
(GHn)0<n<∞ and WGH∞ . We split this set rules in three parts: the ﬁrst one (see Fig. 2) contains the logical rules which
decompose the formulas of the form a : A ⊗ B where ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃}; the second one (see Fig. 3) contains the modal rules
applied to the formulas of the form a : A where  ∈ {,♦} and A is a formula; and the third one (see Fig. 4) contains
satisfaction rules applied to formulas of the form a : b. From now on, if we note GHn , it means that we are only talking about
the ﬁnitary versions.
Let us remind that the hypersequent structure Γ11 | · · · | Γk k has been introduced as a generalization of Gentzen’s
sequent [3,4]. It is a multiset of sequents, called components, with “|” denoting a disjunction at the meta-level. Here, we are
interested in a variant of the hypersequent structure called sequent-of-relations which is a nice structure for proof-search in
Gödel logic [5]. Recently, a sequent calculus using this structure for the ♦-free fragment of GM∞ has been deﬁned in [23].
The structure that we use corresponds to the sequent-of-relations structure and an additional context, called witness context,
in which some formulas are associated to nominals.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A sequent is a structure of the form
W ; [A1 1 B1 | A2 2 B2 | · · · | Ak k Bk]
where W , called the witness context, is a set of pairs of the form (c,a : A) with c,a ∈ Nom and A is of the form B with
 ∈ {,♦} and B a formula; and for i = 1,2, . . . ,k, the sign i is either  or <, and Ai and Bi are relative formulas, namely
formulas of the form a : A, or constants (⊥ and ).
We note Form(S), with S a sequent, the set of formulas in S . Moreover, we deﬁne the notation V g(A) by
V g(A) =
{
V g(g(a), B) if A ≡ a : B
0 if A ≡ ⊥
1 if A ≡ 
Deﬁnition 4.2. A sequent S = W ; [A1 1 B1 | · · · | Ak k Bk] is valid in the Kripke model M = (U , R, V ) w.r.t. the M-
assignment g , written M, g  S , iff if
• for all (c,a :A) ∈ W , V g(g(a),A) = R(g(a), g(c))V g(g(c), A); and
• for all (c,a : ♦A) ∈ W , V g(g(a),♦A) = R(g(a), g(c)) ∗ V g(g(c), A),
then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that the inequality V g(Ai) i V g(Bi) holds.
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W ; [G | a :A < C] [
<
L (1)]
W ; [G | a :A C |  C | b : A < a : ♦b] W ; [G | a :A C | b : A C]
W ; [G | a :A C] [

L (1)]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c c : A | C < c : A] W ; [G | C < ]
W ; [G | C < a :A] [
<
R1(2)]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c c : A | C  c : A]
W ; [G | C  a :A] [

R1(2)]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c c : A | C < c : A] W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | C < ]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | C < a :A] [
<
R2]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c c : B | C  c : A]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | C  a :A] [

R2]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c c : A | a :A < c : A] W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a :A < ]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G] [W
1
]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | c : A < a : ♦c] W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | c : A < a :A]
W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G] [W
2
]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G | a : ♦c  C | c : A  C]
W ; [G | a : ♦A  C] [♦L1(3)]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G | a : ♦c  C | c : A  C]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G | a : ♦A  C] [♦L2]
W ; [G | C  a : ♦A | C  a : ♦b] W ; [G | C  a : ♦A | C  b : A]
W ; [G | C  a : ♦A] [♦R (4)]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G | a : ♦A < a : ♦c] W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G | a : ♦A < c : A]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G] [W
1♦]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G | a : ♦c < a : ♦A | c : A < a : ♦A]
W ∪ {(c,a : ♦A)}; [G] [W
2♦]
(1) a : ♦b ∈ Form(W ; [G | a :A  C]).
(2) c /∈ Nom(W ; [G | C  a :A]) and there is no pair in W containing a :A.
(3) c /∈ Nom(W ; [G | a : ♦A  C]) and A /∈ Nom.
(4) a : ♦b ∈ Form(G | C  a : ♦A) and B /∈ Nom.
Fig. 3. Modal rules for GHn and WGH∞ .
A sequent S is valid in M= (U , R, V ), written M  S , iff for all M-assignment g , M, g  S holds. A sequent S is valid
in GHn (resp. WGH∞), written GHn  S (resp. WGH∞  S), iff it is valid in every GHn-Kripke model (resp. WGH∞-Kripke
model).
Proposition 4.3. Let A be a formula andM be a model,M  A iffM  a : A where a /∈ Nom(A).
Proof. For the if part, we suppose that M  A. Thus, by assigning to a the world in M where A is not valid, we obtain
M  a : A. The only if part is trivial. 
From Proposition 4.3 and the deﬁnition of the validity of the relational sequents in GHn (resp. WGH∞), we deduce that
a formula A is valid in GHn (resp. WGH∞) iff GHn  ∅; [ a : A] (resp. WGH∞  ∅; [ a : A]) where a /∈ Nom(A).
Considering a proof rule as composed of premises Hi with a conclusion C , it is sound if, for any instance of the rule, the
validity of the premises Hi entails the validity of C . It is strongly sound if, for any instance of the rule and any model M, if
M is a model of all the Hi then it is a model of C . Moreover, a proof rule is invertible if, for any instance of the rule, the
non-validity of at least one Hi entails the non-validity of C . It is strongly invertible if, for any instance of this rule and any
modal model M, if M is a countermodel of at least one of its premises then it is a countermodel of its conclusion. We can
observe that strong invertibility implies invertibility.
We call derivation of a sequent S any tree labelled with sequents such that the root node is labelled with S and the
labels at the immediate successors of a node n are the premises of a rule having the label at n as conclusion.
Proposition 4.4. LetM= (W , R, V ) be amodel and g be anM-assignment. Then, for all a, c ∈ Nom, V g(g(a),♦c) = R(g(a), g(c)).
Proof. We have V g(g(a),♦c) = supr{R(g(a),w ′) ∗ V g(w ′, c)}. Since V g(w ′, c) > 0(= 1) iff g(c) = w ′ , we deduce that
V g(g(a),♦c) = R(g(a), g(c)). 
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W ; [G | a : b : A  C] [:L ]
W ; [G | A  b : B]
W ; [G | A  a : b : B] [:R ]
W ; [G |   C]
W ; [G | a : a  C] [idL ]
W ; [G | A  ]
W ; [G | A  a : a] [idR ]
W ; [G | ⊥  C]
W ; [G | a : ⊥  C] [⊥L ]
W ; [G | A  ⊥]
W ; [G | A  a : ⊥] [⊥R ]
W ; [G |   C]
W ; [G | a :   C] [L ]
W ; [G | A  ]
W ; [G | A  a : ] [R ]
(W ; [G |  < C])[a/b] W ; [G | ⊥ < C |  a : b]
W ; [G | a : b < C] [sub
1
L ]
(W ; [G |  C])[a/b]
W ; [G | a : b C] [sub
2
L ]
(W ; [G | A < ])[a/b] W ; [G |  a : b]
W ; [G | A < a : b] [sub
1
R ]
W ; [G | A⊥ |  a : b]
W ; [G | A a : b] [sub
2
R (∗)]
(∗) A = .
Fig. 4. Satisfaction rules for GHn and WGH∞ .
Proposition 4.5. Let A be a formula, a and b be two nominals,M= (W , R, V ) be a model and g be anM-assignment. If g(a) = g(b)
then, for all w ∈ W , V g(w, A) = V g(w, A[a/b]).
Proof. By structural induction on A. 
Theorem 4.6. The (logical, modal and satisfaction) rules of GHn and WGH∞ are strongly sound.
Proof. We know that the GHn-Kripke models and the WGH∞-Kripke models are witnessed models: the inﬁmum and the
supremum functions, used in the deﬁnition of the extension of the valuations to formulas, correspond respectively to the
minimum and the maximum. So using this common property, we deal with GHn and WGH∞ without distinguishing one
from the others.
Let L ∈ {GHn | n ∈ N∗ and n = ∞} ∪ {WGH∞}. A rule H1···HkC [R] is strongly sound in L iff if M is a countermodel of C
then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that M is a countermodel of Hi . We only develop the cases of [⊃<L ], [⊃R ], [<L ], [R ],
[W 1], [W 2] and [sub1L], the other cases being similar.
– Case [⊃<L ]. Let S = W ; [G | a : A ⊃ B < C], M= (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such thatM, g  S . Then, M, g  W ; [G] and V g(g(a), A ⊃ B) V g(C) hold. If V g(g(a), A) V g(g(a), B) then M, g  a : B < a :
A and we deduce M, g  W ; [G | a : B < a : A]. Otherwise, we have (V g(g(a), A) > V g(g(a), B)). Then, V g(g(a), A⊃ B) =
V g(g(a), B) and V g(g(a), B)  V g(C) hold. Thus, we have M, g  a : B < C and we deduce that M, g  W ; [G | a :
B < C].
– Case [⊃R ]. Let S = W ; [G | C  a : A ⊃ B], M= (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such thatM, g  S . Then, M, g  W ; [G] and V g(C) > V g(g(a), A⊃ B) hold. If V g(g(a), A) V g(g(a), B) then V g(g(a), A⊃ B) =
1< V g(C) and we get a contradiction. Then V g(g(a), A) > V g(g(a), B) and V g(C) > V g(g(a), B) = V g(g(a), A⊃ B) hold.
Thus, M, g  a : A  a : B | C  a : B holds and we deduce that M, g  W ; [G | a : A  a : B | C  a : B].
– Case [<L ]. Let S = W ; [G | a :A < C] such that a : ♦b ∈ Form(S), M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be anM-assignment such that M, g  S . Then, M, g  W ; [G] and V g(g(a),A)  V g(C) hold. We have V g(g(a),A) =
min{R(g(a),w ′)V g(w ′, A) | w ′ ∈ U } (M is a witnessed model). Using Proposition 4.4, V g(g(a),♦b) = R(g(a), g(b))
holds. Thus, V g(g(a),A) R(g(a), g(b))V g(g(b), A) = V g(g(a),♦b ⊃ b : A) and V g(g(a),♦b ⊃ b : A) V g(C) hold.
So we obtain M, g  a : ♦b ⊃ (b : A) < C . Using the same arguments of the case [⊃<L ], we deduce that M, g  W ; [G |
a :A < C | b : A < a : ♦b] or M, g  W ; [G | a :A < C | b : A < C].
– Case [R1]. Let S = W ; [G | C  a : A], M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such
that M, g  S . Then, M, g  W ; [G] and V g(C) > V g(g(a),A) hold. We have V g(C) > min{R(g(b),w ′)V g(w ′, B) |
w ′ ∈ U }. Then, there exists w ′ ∈ U such that V g(g(a),A) = R(g(b),w ′)V g(w ′, B) < V g(C). Let c be a new nominal
(c /∈ Nom(S)). We deﬁne a new M-assignment g′ as follows:
g′(n) =
{
w ′ if n = c
g(n) otherwise
Clearly, we have M, g′  W ∪ {(c,a : A)}; [G | C  a : ♦c ⊃ (c : A)]. Using the same arguments of the case [⊃R ], we
deduce that M, g′  W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c  c : A | C  c : A].
– Case [R2]. Let S = W ∪ {(c,a : A)}; [G | C  a : A], M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-
assignment such that M, g  S . Then, M, g  W ∪ {(c,a : A)}; [G] and V g(C) > V g(g(a),A) hold. Hence, V g(C) >
R(g(a), g(c))V g(g(c), A) = V g(g(a),♦c ⊃ c : A) holds. Thus, M, g  W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | C  a : ♦c ⊃ (c : A)]. Using
the same arguments of the case [⊃], we deduce that M, g  W ∪ {(c,a :A)}; [G | a : ♦c  c : A | C  c : A].R
378 D. Galmiche, Y. Salhi / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 371–385– Cases [W 1] and [W 2]. The strongly soundness of these two rules comes from the fact that if M= (U , R, V ) satisﬁes
the witness context w.r.t. g then, for all pairs (c,a :A) in the witnessed context, V g(a :A) = V g(a : ♦c⊃ c : A) holds.
– Case [sub1L]. Let S = W ; [G | a : b < C], M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such
that M, g  S . Then, M, g  W ; [G] and V g(g(a),b)  V g(C) hold. If g(a) = g(b) then V g(g(a),b) = 1  V g(C)
holds and using Proposition 4.5 we obtain M, g  (W ; [G |  < C])[a/b]. Otherwise, from g(a) = g(b) we obtain
1> V g(g(a),b) = 0 and 0 V g(C). Therefore, we deduce that M, g  W ; [G | ⊥ < C |  a : b]. 
Theorem 4.7. The (logical, modal and satisfaction) rules of GHn and WGH∞ are strongly invertible.
Proof. For the same reasons as these given in the proof of Theorem 4.6, we deal with GHn and WGH∞ without distinguish-
ing one from the others.
Let L ∈ {GHn | n ∈ N∗ and n = ∞}∪ {WGH∞}. A rule H1···HkC [R] is strongly invertible in L iff, for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, if M
is a countermodel of Hi then M is a countermodel of C . We only develop the cases of [⊃<L ], [⊃R ], [R1] and [sub1L], the
other cases being similar or trivial.
– Case [⊃<L ]. Subcase of the left premise. Let M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such
that M, g  W ; [G | a : B < a : A]. Then, M, g  W ; [G] and V g(g(a), A ⊃ B) = 1 hold. Since M, g   < C , M, g  a :
A ⊃ B < C holds and we deduce that M, g  W ; [G | a : A ⊃ B < C].
Subcase of the right premise. Let M= (W , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such that M, g 
W ; [G | a : B < C]. Since V g(g(a), B) V g(g(a), A ⊃ B), M, g  a : A ⊃ B < C holds and we deduce that M, g  W ; [G |
a : A ⊃ B < C].
– Case [⊃R ]. Let M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such that M, g  W ; [G | a : A 
a : B | C  a : B]. Then, M, g  W ; [G], V g(g(a), A) > V g(g(a), B) and V g(C) > V g(g(a), B) hold. Since V g(g(a), A) >
V g(g(a), B), V g(g(a), A ⊃ B) = V g(g(a), B) and V g(C) > V g(g(a), A ⊃ B) hold. Thus, M, g  W ; [G | C  a : A ⊃ B]
holds.
– Case [R1]. Let M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such that M, g  W ∪ {(c,a :
A)}; [G | a : ♦c  c : A | C  c : A]. Then, M, g  W ; [G], V g(g(a),♦c) > V g(g(c), A) and V g(C) > V g(g(c), A) hold.
We have V g(g(a),A) = V (g(a),♦c ⊃ (c : A)). Since V g(g(a),♦c) > V g(g(c), A), V (g(a),♦c ⊃ (c : A)) = V g(g(c), A)
and V g(C) > V (g(a),A) hold. Thus, we deduce that M, g  W ; [G | C  a :A].
– Case [sub1L]. Subcase of the left premise. Let M = (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such
that M, g  (W ; [G |  < C])[a/b]. Then, M, g  (W ; [G])[a/b] holds. We deﬁne a new M-assignment g′ as follows:
g′(n) =
{
g(b) if n = a
g(n) otherwise
We can show that M, g′  W ; [G] and V ′g(g′(a),b) = 1. Thus, M, g′  W ; [G | a : b < C] holds.
Subcase of the right premise. Let M= (U , R, V ) be an L-Kripke model and g be an M-assignment such that M, g 
W ; [G | ⊥ < C |   a : b]. Then, M, g  W ; [G], V g(C) = 0 and 1 > V g(g(a),b) hold. From 1 > V g(g(a),b) we have
g(a) = g(b) and then V g(g(a),b) = 0. Thus, M, g  W ; [G | a : b < C] holds. 
5. Decidability and ﬁnite model property
In this section, we propose decision procedures with countermodel generation for the logics (GHn)0<n<∞ and WGH∞ .
Our approach is based on two main steps:
1. to reduce, by a proof search process using our proof rules, a sequent into a set of so-called irreducible sequents;
2. to decide these irreducible sequents by a speciﬁc procedure.
The main problem is that the application of our proof rules to a sequent does not always terminate. In order to solve it
we introduce a notion of normal derivation where the number of applications of the problematic rules is ﬁnite. The decision
procedure for the irreducible sequents is obtained by using a technique developed for Gödel logics [22]. It consists of the
construction of a semantic graph, called bi-colored graph, and of a characterization of validity based on the detection of
particular chains in such a graph.
5.1. Termination and irreducible sequents
It is easy to see that the application of our proof rules to a sequent does not always terminate. This is mainly due to
the rules [<L ], [L ], [♦R ], [W 1], [W 2], [W 1♦] and [W 2♦] where in each one the premises are more complex than the
conclusion. We call these rules the contraction rules. To solve this problem, we deﬁne particular derivations, called normal
derivations, in which we avoid unnecessary applications of these rules.
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• for the same pair of principal formulas (a : A,a : ♦b) and the same component a : A  C , the rule [L ] is applied
only once;
• for the same pair of principal formulas (a : ♦A,a : ♦b) and the same component C  a : ♦A, the rule [♦R ] is applied
only once;
• for the same pair (c,a :A) in the witness context, the rule [W 1] (resp. [W 2]) is applied once;
• for the same pair (c,a : ♦A) in the witness context, the rule [W 1♦] (resp. [W 2♦]) is applied once; and• a branch is ﬁnite if and only if we cannot apply any non-contraction rule to the sequent of the last node of this branch.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let A be a formula, the subformulas of A are deﬁned by
• A is a subformula of A;
• if B ⊗ C is a subformula of A then so are B , C , for ⊗ = ∧,∨,⊃;
• if B is a subformula of A then so is B , for =,♦;
• if a : B is a subformula of A then so is B .
In order to prove the ﬁniteness of any normal derivation, we introduce a notion of subformula different from the usual
one, called N-subformula, N being a set of nominals.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Let N be a ﬁnite set of nominals and a : A be a formula. The N-subformulas of a : A are deﬁned as follows:
• a : A is an N-subformula of a : A;
• if b : B is an N-subformula of a : A then so is (b : B)[c1/c2], for c1, c2 ∈ Nom and c2 ∈ N;
• if b : B ⊗ C is an N-subformula of a : A then so are b : B and b : C , for ⊗ = ∧,∨,⊃;
• if b :B is an N-subformula of a : A then so is c : B , for c ∈ Nom and =,♦.
Proposition 5.4. If b : B is an N-subformula of a : A then B is obtained from a subformula of a : A by substituting some of its nominals
(possibly none) by nominals in N.
Proof. By structural induction on A. 
Theorem 5.5. Let S be a sequent, N = Nom(S) and D be a normal derivation of S . Any formula appearing in D is either an N-
subformula of a formula in S , a formula of the form a : ♦c or a constant.
Proof. We only have to prove that for all the rules, if any formula appearing in the conclusion is either an N-subformula of
a formula in S , a formula of the form a : ♦c or a constant then so is any formula in the premises. 
Deﬁnition 5.6. The nesting degree of a formula A, denoted nest(A), is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• nest(p) = nest(a) = nest(⊥) = nest() = 0;
• nest(A ⊗ B) =max(nest(A),nest(B)) where ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃};
• nest(a : A) = nest(A); and
• nest(A) = 1+ nest(A) where  ∈ {,♦}.
Proposition 5.7. Let S be a sequent and D be a normal derivation of S . The set of the formulas of the form a : ♦c appearing in D is
ﬁnite.
Proof. Let N = Nom(S). We start by proving that for every nominal a, the set of the formulas a : ♦c appearing in D is
ﬁnite. For all a : ♦c appearing in D, c ∈ N or c is introduced using one of the rules [<R1], [R1] and [♦L1] with a formula
a : A ( =  or ♦) as principal formula. We know that every formula a : A introduces at most one nominal. Using
Proposition 5.4 and Theorem 5.5, A is obtained from a subformula of formula in S by substituting some of its nominals
by nominals in N . Since N and the set of the subformulas of the formulas in S are ﬁnite, we deduce that for every
nominal a, the set of the formulas a : ♦c appearing in D is ﬁnite.
We can prove by induction on k = max{nest(a : A) | a : A ∈ Form(S)} that in every sequent appearing in D, there is no
chain of the form a : ♦a1,a1 : ♦a2, . . . ,an−1 : ♦an with a1, . . . ,an /∈ N satisfying n > k. Thus, we deduce that there is no
chain a0 : ♦a1,a1 : ♦a2, . . . ,an−1 : ♦an where n > nest(S) × #N and for i, j = 0, . . . ,n, ai = a j holds. Therefore, the set of
the formulas a : ♦c appearing in D is ﬁnite. Indeed, the formulas of the form a : ♦c in any sequent appearing in D form a
directed graph where the nodes and the arcs are respectively the nominals and the formulas of the form a : ♦c appearing
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every chain of distinct nodes has a length smaller than k = nest(S) × #N . Such graphs have the number of nodes smaller
than n
k+1−1
n−1 (the number of the nodes of the complete n-ary tree of height k). 
Theorem 5.8. All the normal derivations are ﬁnite.
Proof. Using Proposition 5.7 and the conditions associated to the application of the contraction rules, we deduce that the
number of applications of the modal rules in any normal derivation are ﬁnite. Thus, it is suﬃcient to prove that every
derivation using only the logical and the satisfaction rules is ﬁnite. To do this, we show that for every rule, its conclusion is
more complex than its premises by using a measure of complexity over the components. The ﬁrst measure on formulas is
deﬁned by:
• α(p) = 1 where p ∈ Var ∪ Nom ∪ {⊥,};
• α(A ⊗ B) = α(A) + α(B) + 1 where ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃};
• α(A) = α(A) + 1 where  ∈ {,♦};
• α(a : A) = 1+ α(A).
From this deﬁnition we deﬁne a measure over the components:
β(A  C) =
{
0 if A ≡ , = and C ≡ a : b
α(A) + α(B) otherwise
The order relation > on components, with C1 > C2 iff β(C1) > β(C2), is well-founded. Now, we deﬁne an order relation
on multisets of components: let M1 and M2 be two multisets of components, M1 >m M2 iff M2 is obtained form M1 by
replacing one or more components by a ﬁnite number of components, such that if C1 is replaced by C2 then β(C1) > β(C2).
Since the relation order on components is well-founded, the order relation >m is well-founded [11]. It is the order relation
which is used to show that in every rule, the conclusion is greater than the premises. For the rule [sub2R ], we have β(A 
a : b) > β(A ⊥) and β(A  a : b) > β( a : b) = 0. From this we deduce that for every instance of [sub2R ], the conclusion
is more complex than the premise (according >m). 
Deﬁnition 5.9. An irreducible sequent is a sequent appearing in a leaf node of a normal derivation.
Proposition 5.10. In any irreducible sequent, any component has one of the following forms:
• a :A  b : ♦B where B /∈ Nom;
• a :A  b : p where p ∈ Prop;
• a :A  C where C ∈ {⊥,};
• a : p  b : ♦A where p ∈ Prop;
• C  ♦A where C ∈ {⊥,};
• C1  C2 where for i = 1,2, Ci ∈ {⊥,}, Ci ≡ a : p with p ∈ Prop or Ci ≡ a : ♦b with a,b ∈ Nom;
•  a : b where a,b ∈ Nom.
Proof. There is always a rule that can be applied to any sequent containing a component that is not of one of the previous
forms. 
5.2. Decision procedures for irreducible sequents
We have seen that any normal derivation is ﬁnite and their leaf nodes are labelled with irreducible sequents. Hence,
from the strong soundness and invertibility of our proof rules, if we have a decision procedure for the irreducible sequents
then we can obtain a decision procedure for the sequents by combining the procedure for the irreducible sequents with a
proof-search using our rules.
Let us introduce some concepts ﬁrst developed for Gödel logics [22].
Deﬁnition 5.11. A bi-colored graph is a ﬁnite oriented graph with two kinds of arrows, the green ones represented by →
and the red ones represented by ⇒.
We use the symbols → and ⇒ to denote the corresponding relation in the graph. For example →⇒ represents the
composition of two relations and u→⇒w means that there exists a path u → v ⇒ w in the graph. The relation → is
the reﬂexive and transitive closure of →, i.e., the accessibility of the relation →. Moreover → + ⇒ is the union of both
relations.
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of G is a chain of the form (→⇒)k .
The key point of our approach consists in associating a bi-colored graph to a given irreducible sequent in the given logic
and in relating validity with the existence of ⇒-cycle or k-alternating chain. Let us consider this approach for our new
logics.
Deﬁnition 5.13. Let S = W ; [Cp1 | Cp2 | · · · | Cpk] be an irreducible sequent, the bi-colored graph GS associated to S is built
as follows:
• the set of the nodes, denoted N , is the union of the following sets:
· {a : p | p ∈ Prop and a : p is a formula in S};
· {a : ♦b | b ∈ Nom and a : ♦b is a formula in S};
· {⊥,};
• the set of the arrows, denoted A, is the union of the set B and the sets Ai=1,...,k deﬁned as follows:
· B = {⊥ → n | n ∈N and n = } ∪ {n→  | n ∈N and n = ⊥} ∪ {⊥ ⇒ };
· for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, Ai is obtained from the component Cpi as follows:
if Cpi ≡ a :A  b : ♦B such that B /∈ Nom then Ai = ∅;
else if Cpi ≡   a : b then Ai = ∅;
else if Cpi ≡ a :A < C then Ai = ∅;
else if Cpi ≡ C < a : ♦A then Ai = ∅;
else if Cpi ≡ a :A  C (C is in N ) then Ai = {C ⇒ };
else if Cpi ≡ C  a : ♦A such that A /∈ Nom (C is in N ) then Ai = {⊥ ⇒ C};
else if Cpi ≡ C1  C2 (C1 and C2 are in N ) then if = then Ai = {C2 ⇒ C1}; else Ai = {C2 → C1}.
Let us illustrate this construction with the following sequent S:
∅; [a :(p ∧ q) a : p | a : ♦c < a : p | b : q b : ♦c | b : q a : ♦(p ∧ q)]
The bi-colored graph associated to S is the following:
Proposition 5.14. Let S be an irreducible sequent and GS be its associated bi-colored graph. LetM= (W , R, V ) be a countermodel of
S w.r.t. theM-assignment g and CH= C1 →·· ·→Ck ⇒Ck+1 be a chain in GH . Then we have V g(C1) · · · V g(Ck) < V g(Ck+1).
Proof. For all Ci → Ci+1 in CH , we have either Ci+1 < Ci is a component in S , Ci+1 =  or Ci = ⊥. Thus, since M is a
countermodel of S w.r.t. g , we deduce that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, V g(Ci) V g(Ci+1).
Moreover, since the ⇒ arrow Ck ⇒ Ck+1 is in GS , we have either
• Ck+1 =  and a :A  Ck is a component in S;
• Ck = ⊥ and Ck+1  a : ♦A is a component in S;
• Ck = ⊥ and Ck+1 = ; or
• Ck+1  Ck is a component in S .
Hence, since M is a countermodel of S w.r.t. g , we deduce that V g(Ck) < V g(Ck+1). 
We can deﬁne, from a bi-colored graph G , the notion of bi-height that is a function h : G → N such that for any u, v ∈ G ,
if u → v ∈ G then h(u)  h(v) and if u ⇒ v ∈ G then h(u) < h(v) [20,22]. Then a countermodel can be generated from G
by using the following results: if a bi-colored graph G does not contain a ⇒-cycle (resp. an n-alternating chain) then there
exists a bi-height h (resp. that satisﬁes h(v) < n for any node v in G). Moreover we can decide if a graph contains or not a
⇒-cycle and also compute the bi-height both in linear time. For more details, refer to [22].
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alternating chain.
Proof. Let us call D the normal derivation containing S .
First we prove the if part. Let S ′ = W ; [Cp1 | . . . | Cpk] be an irreducible sequent. We suppose that GS = (N ,A) does
not contain a chain of the form (→⇒)n+1. Then there exists a bi-height h : GS → {0, . . . ,n}. Let h′ be the function from
{a : p | a ∈ Nom(S) and p ∈ Prop} ∪ {a : ♦b | a,b ∈ Nom(S)} to {0, . . . ,n} deﬁned using h as follows:
h′(A) =
{
n if A ∈N and h(A) = h()
h(A) if A ∈N , h(A) = h() and h(A) = h(⊥)
0 otherwise
Then, we deﬁne the GHn-Kripke model M = (U , R, V ) as follows:
• U = Nom(S);
• for all a,a′ ∈ U , R(a,a′) = h′(a:♦a′)n ;
• for all p ∈ Prop and a ∈ U , V (a, p) = h′(a:p)n .
Moreover, we deﬁne the M-assignment g as follows:
g(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Nom(S)
b otherwise, such that b ∈ U
Let nest′ be the function obtained by changing in the deﬁnition of the nest value in the case ♦A as follows:
nest′(♦A) =
{
0 if A ∈ Nom
1+ nest′(A) otherwise
Now, we prove that M is a countermodel of S , i.e., a countermodel of any component Cpi∈{1,,k} and satisfying W .
First, we prove that, for any Cpi ≡ C1  C2, V g(C1)  V g(C2) holds.
For the case of a component Cp = C1  C2 where nest′(C1) = nest′(C2) = 0, the proof is simple. For example in the
case of the components of the form   a : b (a = b), since g(a) = a = b = g(b), V g(a : b) = 0 holds and we deduce that
V g() > V g(a : b).
Now, we deal with the other cases. We prove that, for all components Cp′ = C ′1  C ′2 in the branch of D containing S ′
(denoted B), V g(C ′1)  V g(C ′2) holds. This is done by induction on nest′(C ′1) + nest′(C ′2) and on the length of the subbranch
delimited by the sequent containing C ′p and S ′ , denoted SB.
If nest′(C ′1) + nest′(C ′2) = 0 then the result is obtained by a simple induction on the length of SB. The ﬁrst statement
(length of SB equals to 0) is the case treated previously where the components of S does not contain a formula of the
forms a : A and a : ♦A with A /∈ Nom. In the other statement the proof is obtained using the induction hypothesis and
arguments similar to the ones given in the proof of Theorem 4.7.
If the length of SB is equal to 0 and nest′(C ′1) + nest′(C ′2) > 0 then we have the following cases:
• Cp′ = a :A  C where C ≡ c : p or C ∈ {,⊥};
• Cp′ = C  a : ♦A where C ≡ c : p or C ∈ {,⊥} (A /∈ Nom);
• Cp′ = a :A  b : ♦B .
We only develop the case Cp′ = a :A  c : p, the other cases being similar. From the deﬁnition of our model M, we have
V g(c : p) < 1. If there is no formula of the form a : ♦b in S ′ then V g(a : A) = 1 and we obtain V g(a : A) > V g(c : p).
Otherwise, for all a : ♦b in S ′ , there is a sequent in B containing either Cp′1 = b : A < a : ♦b or Cp′2 = b : A  c : p. Hence,
by applying the induction hypothesis (nest′(b : A)+ nest′(a : ♦b) = nest′(b : A) + nest′(c : p) < nest′(a :A)+ nest′(c : p)), we
deduce that V g(a :A) > V g(c : p).
In the case where the length of SB and nest′(C1)+nest′(C2) are strictly positive, the proof is obtained simply by applying
the induction hypothesis.
Now, we prove that M w.r.t. g satisﬁes W . For all (c,a : A) ∈ W , there is a sequent appearing in B containing ei-
ther the component a : A <  or the components a : ♦c  c : A and a : A < c : A (the rule [W 1]). We know that
for all components Cp′ = C ′1  C ′2 appearing in B, V g(C ′1)  V g(C ′2) holds. Thus, we deduce that, for all (c,a : A) ∈ W ,
V g(a : A)  R(g(a), g(c))V g(c : A). Moreover, from the rule [W 2] and using similar arguments, we have, for all
(c,a :A) ∈ W , V g(a :A) R(g(a), g(c))V g(c : A). Hence, for all (c,a :A) ∈ W , V g(a :A) = R(g(a), g(c))V g(c : A).
The case of the pairs of the form (c,a : ♦A) is similar (from the rules [W 1♦] and [W 2♦]). Therefore, M w.r.t. g satisﬁes W .
We now prove the only if part. Let M= (U , R, V ) w.r.t. g be a countermodel of S . We suppose that there exists a chain
of the form (→⇒)n+1 in GS : C0 → ⇒ C1 → ⇒ C2 → ⇒ ·· · → ⇒ Cn → ⇒ Cn+1. Thus, by Proposition 5.14, there is a
strictly increasing sequence of n + 2 elements in the set of truth values. As this set does contain only n + 1 elements, we
get a contradiction. 
D. Galmiche, Y. Salhi / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 371–385 383Theorem 5.16. GS An irreducible sequent S has a countermodel in WGH∞ if and only if its bi-colored graph GS does not contain a
⇒-cycle.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 5.15.
First we prove the if part. if GS = (N ,A) does not contain a ⇒-cycle, we know that there exist n ∈ N and bi-height
h : GS → {0, . . . ,n}. Let h′ be the function from {a : p | a ∈ Nom(S) and p ∈ Prop} ∪ {a : ♦b | a,b ∈ Nom(S)} to {0, . . . ,n}
deﬁned using h as follows:
h′(A) =
{
n if A ∈N and h(A) = h()
h(A) if A ∈N , h(A) = h() and h(A) = h(⊥)
0 otherwise
Then, we deﬁne the WGH∞-Kripke model M = (U , R, V ) as follows:
• U = Nom(S);
• for all a,a′ ∈ U , R(a,a′) = h′(a:♦a′)n ;
• for all p ∈ Prop and a ∈ U , V (a, p) = h′((w,p))n .
Moreover, we deﬁne the M-assignment g as follows:
g(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Nom(S)
b otherwise, where b ∈ U
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.15, we prove that M is a countermodel of S .
For the only if part: the existence of a chain C → ⇒ → · · · → ⇒ → ⇒C implies that there exists x ∈ [0,1] such that
x< x (Proposition 5.14) and then we get a contradiction. 
Let us give a simple example: S = ∅; [a :p  a : p]. It is easy to see that we cannot apply any rule to S . Thus, S is an
irreducible sequent. Its associated bi-colored graph is:
This graph does not contain a ⇒-cycle. In order to extract a countermodel we modify the previous graph in such a way
that ⇒ arrows always go up and → arrows never go down.
Then, we deduce that M = ({a}, R, V ), where R(a,a) = 0 and V (a, p) = 0, is a countermodel of S in GH1 and then in
(GHn)0<n<∞ and WGH∞ .
Let us recall that the search for alternating chains in bi-graphs in the case of Gödel logics can be characterized as a
resource use bounding problem in some particular process calculus [21]. Intuitively, the red arrows represent ressource
consumption and this allows to characterize Gödel logics as resource use bounding logics. In future work, we will study the
possibility to establish a similar characterization for Gödel hybrid logics.
5.3. Decision procedures for (GHn)0<n<∞ and WGH∞
Now, we illustrate the results previously obtained by proposing decision procedures with countermodel generation for L
with L ∈ {(GHn)0<n<∞,WGH∞}. The main point is that for every sequent S one can effectively ﬁnd a set IR of irreducible
sequents, so that S is valid in L iff S ′ is valid in L for every S ′ ∈ IR.
To decide a sequent S in WGH∞ (resp. (GHn)0<n<∞), the steps of the procedure are the following:
Step 1: We generate from S the set IR of irreducible sequents obtained by application of our proof rules.
Step 2: For each irreducible sequent S ′ in IR, we construct its associated bi-colored graph GS ′ .
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– Otherwise, S ′ has a countermodel in WGH∞ (resp. (GHn)0<n<∞) obtained from GS ′ as follows:
• We modify GS ′ = (N ,A) in such a way that ⇒ arrows always go up and → arrows never go down. This is possible
because GS ′ does not contain a ⇒-cycle.
• We extract from this modiﬁed graph the bi-height h which is a function from the nodes of GS ′ to {0, . . . ,n} where
· for all C1 → C2 in GS ′ , h(C1) h(C2);
· for all C1 ⇒ C2 in GS ′ , h(C1) < h(C2).
An eﬃcient algorithm to compute a bi-height when there is no ⇒-cycle is provided in [22].
• We deﬁne from h a new function h′ : {a : p | a ∈ Nom(S) and p ∈ Prop} ∪ {a : ♦b | a,b ∈ Nom(S)} → {0, . . . ,n} by:
h′(A) =
{
n if A ∈N and h(A) = h()
h(A) if A ∈N , h(A) = h() and h(A) = h(⊥)
0 otherwise
The countermodel M= (W , R, V ) of S ′ in WGH∞ (resp. (GHn)0<n<∞) is obtained as follows:
• W = Nom(S ′);
• for all a,a′ ∈ W , R(a,a′) = h′(a:♦a′)n ;
• for all p ∈ Prop and a ∈ W , V (a, p) = h′(a:p)n .
If all the elements of IR are valid then, from soundness of our proof rules, we obtain that S is valid. Otherwise there is
an irreducible sequent in IR that has a countermodel M. Hence, from the strong invertibility of our proof rules, M is a
countermodel of S .
Theorem 5.17. WGH∞ and (GHn)0<n<∞ are decidable and have the ﬁnite model property.
Proof. From the above procedure and the way to build countermodels. 
The key point in our decision procedures is the fact that the inﬁmum and the supremum correspond respectively to the
minimum and the maximum. Since it is not the case for GH∞ , the same idea cannot be applied for this logic.
6. A sequent calculus for WGH∞
In this section we propose a calculus for WGH∞ called WGH, that is deﬁned by the proof rules of Figs. 2–4 and the
following axiom and structural rules:
W ; [G | A  A] [I D]
W ; [G | ⊥]
W ; [G] [EW1]
W ; [G | A < ⊥]
W ; [G] [EW2]
W ; [G |  < A]
W ; [G] [EW3]
W ; [G | A  C]
W ; [G | A  B | B  C] [com1]
W ; [G | A  C]
W ; [G | A  B | B  C] [com2]
where in the rules [EW2] and [EW3], A ∈ Form(G). However, this condition is not necessary.
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness). The rules of WGH calculus are sound.
Proof. From Theorem 4.6, the rules of Figs. 2–4 are sound. Similar arguments are used for the other rules. 
Theorem 6.2 (Completeness). If a sequent is valid in WGH∞ then it is derivable in WGH calculus.
Proof. We only have to prove that, for any irreducible sequent, if its associated bi-colored graph contains a ⇒-cycle then it
has a derivation using only the structural rules and the axiom. We know that any arrow in the bi-colored graphs correspond
to an inequality: A ⇒ B and A → B correspond respectively to B  A and B < A.
Now, we prove that for any irreducible sequent S , we can obtain, using the structural rules, a sequent containing all the
components associated to the arrows of GS .
– Case of C ⇒  obtained from the component a : A  C in S . Since any component a : A  C introduces a unique
arrow, it is suﬃcient to replace it by  C :
W ; [G |  C]
W ; [G |  < a :A | a :A  C] [com2]
W ; [G | a :A  C] [EW3]
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W ; [G | C ⊥]
W ; [G | C  a : ♦A | a : ♦A < ⊥] [com1]
W ; [G | C  a : ♦A] [EW2]
The components associated to the arrows of the set B are obtained directly by using [EW1], [EW2] and [EW3]. The compo-
nents associated to the other arrows of GS are in S . Clearly, if GS contains a ⇒-cycle then by a succession of applications
of the rules [com1] and [com2] to the sequent containing all the components associated to the arrows of GS , we obtain an
axiom. 
We conjecture that we can obtain systems for (GHn)0<n<∞ by only changing [I D] in WGH with a more general axiom.
This will be studied in further work.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we propose a family of fuzzy hybrid logics based on Gödel logic and its ﬁnitary versions. They are ob-
tained using an approach similar to the one used to introduce intuitionistic hybrid logic [8]. The key point consists in
replacing classical logic in classical hybrid logic with Gödel logic and its ﬁnitary versions. This family is composed of two
inﬁnite-valued hybrid logics, namely GH∞ and WGH∞ , and a sequence of ﬁnite-valued logics (GHn)0<n<∞ . For WGH∞ and
(GHn)0<n<∞ we provide decision procedures with countermodel generation. A key point is the use of strongly invertible
rules and consequently the ability to generate countermodels. Using these decision procedures we show that WGH∞ and
(GHn)0<n<∞ are decidable and have the ﬁnite model property. Another result is the deﬁnition of a sequent calculus for
WGH∞ . In further works we will study proof-search in GH∞ and also introduce other family of fuzzy hybrid logics based
on other fuzzy logics like Łukasiewicz logic and Product logic by exploring their proof-theoretical properties.
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